partially supported by the EU via the AREHCC Project
Just a reminder... Group of Divisors
f monic, deg f = 2g + 1, deg h g. g = genus.
Points on a hyperelliptic curve in general do not form a group! Use divisors, i. e. "sets of points" with multiplicities:
We show how this works "geometrically".
Coordinates of D: the coefficients of U and V .
Assume φ and φ −1 can be computed "quickly".
Instead of Q = n · D in Jac(C)(K), we compute
Transfer all points of D over C toC "simultaneously" by manipulating coordinates of divisor.
[⇐]
Roberto Avanzi -Countermeasures against DPA for HECC -p.11
First Countermeasure: Curve Randomisation
Details in the paper. Two types of isomorphisms:
Using only multiplications: All coefficients of C and of D are multiplied by different powers of a randomly chosen s ∈ K. Total # field muls LESS than in one group op! Using also additions: everything can become slower.
(work with more general curves).
Second Countermeasure: Divisor Randomisation
On embedded hardware, field inversion is very slow.
This prompted the introduction of projective coordinates. They do not require inversions. A group element has many different representations. [⇐]
Roberto Avanzi -Countermeasures against DPA for HECC -p.13
For genus 2 hecc: Projective and New coordinates (Lange).
The randomisation consists in picking a random s ∈ K × and by performing the following replacement
For New coordinates the method is entirely similar.
Goubin type attacks: Context
Remark: randomisation of zero by multiplication by a random value, or by random isomorphism, is... zero! Definition: context of Goubin-type attacks:
Let H be a small subset of the group G s.t.:
The elements of H possess properties which makes their processing detectable by side-channel analysis -for example, zeros in the internal representation -and are invariant under a given randomisation procedure R.
H := set of special points/divisors.
